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Abstract 
The study assessed the effects of fiscal decentralization on public service delivery in Nigeria. This was with a 
view to analyzing the influence of fiscal decentralization on health and educational service delivery in Nigeria 
between 1999 and 2012. Cross sectional (secondary) sources of data was utilized which covered the period of 
1999 to 2012. Data on transfer from federal government (tr), internally generated revenue (igr), loans and grants 
(or), states’ GDP (Y), human development index (hdi), access to health (hel), access to education (edu), fully 
vaccinated children (fvc) and rate of enrolment for primary education (pne) were obtained from the annual 
statistical bulletin published by the Central Bank of Nigeria and Core Welfare Indicators published by the 
National Bureau of Statistics. Two core components of public services (Health and Education) were analyzed, 
and a total of thirty six states in Nigeria including Federal Capital Territory were used. Stata 10.0 Software were 
used for the estimation; data were analyzed using descriptive and econometric technique.  The results showed 
that fiscal decentralization had significant positive effects on educational service delivery (t=2.3, p<0.05); 
conversely, fiscal decentralization had insignificant and negative effects on health service delivery in Nigeria 
(t=1.18, p>0.05). Also, internally generated revenue was statistically equal to zero and contributed negatively to 
public service delivery in Nigeria (t=1.44, p>0.05). The study concluded that there is need to increase states 
government revenue autonomy in order to meet their expenditure responsibility functions of providing 
qualitative public services. 
Keywords: Fiscal Decentralization, Public Service Delivery, Health, Education, States Government and Nigeria. 
 
1.  Introduction 
It has long been recognized that governments differ significantly in the delivery of public services (Tanzi and 
Schuknecht, 1998). Some are extremely wasteful and ineffective in the delivery of these services, whereas others 
achieve their objectives in a systematic and comprehensive way. The strive to improve the delivery of public 
services has spawned a vigorous theoretical literature on channels that may affect it, with a quite prominent one 
being the design of fiscal relation across the levels of government (Antonis, Manthos and Kammas, 2008). 
During the past two decades, a silent revolution in public sector governance has swept across the globe. This 
revolution aimed to move decision making for local public services closer to the people (Shah and Thompson, 
2004) .Thus, decentralization has become a key issue in development policy in the last two decades. 
Decentralization is a process of transitioning from a governance structure in which power is 
concentrated at the federal level to one in which authority to make decisions and implement them is shifted to 
lower level of governments or agencies. It consists of transfer of public functions from higher tiers to sub-
national levels of governance. Anyanwu (1999) defined decentralization as the political-administrative 
arrangement entailing the transfer of the authority to plan, make decisions and manage public functions from the 
federal government to subordinate organization, agencies or units of government, either geographically or 
structurally. The concept can be mirrored as stages along a continuum differentiated by the types and degrees of 
autonomy exercisable by the lower layers of authority within a country. At the lower end, there is more 
administrative or bureaucratic delegation or devolution of fiscal and service delivery functions by the federal 
government to states government.  At the upper end, there is a situation where the lower tiers of government 
enjoy clear-cut statutory autonomy of governance within the framework of constitutionally-enshrined or 
legislated sharing of fiscal power and responsibilities.  
Government may have many reasons for decentralizing. The main reason here is to improve the 
delivery of public services. Conventionally, there are three types of decentralization (IDHR, 2001): 
“Deconcentration” is the weakest form, it means shifting of responsibilities to local administrators who are 
closely supervised by federal government. “Delegation” involves transferring of decision-making and 
administration to semi-autonomous organizations (e.g. public corporations). “Devolution” is the strongest form 
and entails transferring some authority for decision-making, finance, and management. In this case, states 
government can elect their own leaders, raise their own revenue and make their own investment decisions. 
Thus, decentralization can be administrative (transfer of civil servants and public functions to the 
lower level), fiscal (devolution of fiscal resources and revenue generating powers), political (devolution of 
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decision-making powers), Jutting et. al. 2005. In economics, the focus is on fiscal resources, revenue generating 
powers and expenditure responsibilities at the states government levels in order to finance adequately the 
delivery of public services. In theory, fiscal decentralization can be a powerful tool for initiating improvements 
in policies for the citizens. Effective fiscal decentralization results in democratic institutions in which the poor 
can effectively participate and lobby for their interests. Improved knowledge also leads to better matching of 
local needs and better policies. All these lead to improve access to public services, better quality and targeting of 
those services (Jutting et. al. 2005). 
It has been demonstrated that there is strong correlation between a country’s prosperity and the quality 
of its public sector; without effective and efficient fiscal decentralization, government will be unable to translate 
its vision and aspirations into sound policies (Eboh, 2009). A key function of government is to provide essential 
services. Despite the emerging consensus on Nigeria’s need to rely more on the private sector, there is certainly a 
case for governments at all levels to continue participating in the provision of certain services. The questions of 
what the government should provide in terms of services will necessarily depend on a country’s circumstances 
and its stages of development. However, the general consensus from the point of view of citizens’ rights, is that 
government ought to be active in such basic services such as health and education. Public services constitute an 
important foundation for growth and development in any economy. 
One of the most important and enduring competitive advantages that a country can have in this era of 
globalization is an effective, dynamic and responsive public service. “Public service delivery” means the 
provision of affordable, accessible, qualitative and effective basic amenities to the citizens. Kimenyi and 
Shughart (2006) defined public services as those services such as national defence, that are non-excludable, non-
rival and indivisible both in production and consumption. Public services can be divided into two category; 
social and economic services, social services consists of those services that yield benefits to the recipients, for 
instance health and education, while economic services are those services that generate returns to the provider; 
for example; housing, agriculture, transportation and communication network.  Government also frequently 
intervenes in the delivery of improved public services that are only partially rival or partially excludable. 
Government delivery is justified on the basis of equity and efficient delivery to the end users. 
Nigeria is characterized by an inadequate and poor social services, partly accounting for the low life 
expectancy, high infant mortality rate and high level of illiteracy, which in turn retards growth and development 
(World Bank, 2005 and Okojie, 2009). In Nigeria, decentralization is entrenched in the constitution. In practice 
however, the country has not realized its expectations of improved service delivery. Nigeria’s experience of 
decentralization suggests that states government have failed to deliver effective, qualitative and affordable public 
services to the citizens. In this respect, there was over concentration of political and financial powers as well as 
human resources at the federal level to the detriment of states government; decentralization has been used by 
ruling parties at the federal level to renew or consolidate their power and influence at the state level. Due to 
inadequate finance and insufficient tax power, states government in Nigeria depend heavily on federal 
government for funds; in a nutshell, the creation of states has not led to effective fiscal decentralization (Okojie, 
2009). 
In Nigeria, fiscal decentralization is entrenched in the constitution. In practice however, the country 
has not realized its expectations of improved service delivery. The experience of fiscal decentralization in the 
country showed that the constituents units of government that make-up the federation have failed to deliver 
effective, qualitative and affordable public services for their citizens. For instance, there is a consensus that 
geographical access to health care facilities is generally inadequate. The Structural Adjustment era led to the 
reduction of public funding for social sector. As a result, Nigerian health care is now largely characterized by 
underfunding and shortages of drugs, equipment and skilled personnel. The emigration of Nigerian doctors and 
nurses to other countries, helps explaining the personnel shortages.  Furthermore, the health care system shows 
spatial variation in terms of availability. The citizens have to contend with long distances before they can access 
health facilities. Consequently, there is persistent high infant mortality rate, as well as diseases in epidemic 
proportions (Okojie, 2009). 
The infant mortality rate was 110 per 1000 live births in 2005, while the under-five mortality rate was 
197 per 1000 live births in 2005. Maternal mortality rate remains high at 800 per 100,000 live births (National 
Planning Commission 2007a). Since 1999, substantial amounts of resources have accrued to the states 
government and that has presented tremendous opportunities for service delivery. For instance, government 
revenue as a percentage of GDP rose from 16.3 percent in 1998 to 19.8 percent in 2003 and 20.4 percent in 2005. 
In practice, however, the country has not realized its expectations of improved health and education service 
delivery. The primary health care program  is the cornerstone of the health policy and is expected to raise life 
expectancy to 60 years. Nonetheless, these targets have not been met.  A nation’s health care system is an 
indicator of its citizens’ well-being. Nevertheless, health care services in the country have been poor and are 
often characterized by inefficiency, low and deteriorating quality and waste. This is in addition to the fact that 
government spending on health is very low vis-à-vis the recommendation of the World Health 
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Organization(WHO). Although Nigeria is making reasonable progress in increasing its citizens’ access to health 
care, the social indicators show that the country is still one of the world’s poorest when assessed on standard 
health indicators (The World Bank 1996; Central Bank of Nigeria 1999; Obadan et. al. 2004).    
In the same vein, the educational system in Nigeria also experienced a deep crisis for several years and 
has fallen into a deplorable condition in the last two decades. The adult literacy rate was relatively poor at 57 
percent in 1999. A recent Education For All Global Monitoring Report for 2009 noted that Nigeria had the 
highest number of out-of-school children (over 8 million in 2004-2005, 23 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
total). There is little progress given the current trends (7.6 million children are still projected to be out-of-school 
in 2015). Although net enrolment rates have increased, they still below the African regional average. The quality 
of education has fallen significantly at all levels. This is especially at the tertiary level, which witnessed a 
phenomenal brain-drain to other parts of the world. The federal government, in order to address the declining 
rate in the education sector; packaged a set of objectives for the education system, which include the eradication 
of illiteracy by 2010 and the acquisition of science and technology education and its effective application. The 
measures employed to achieve the objectives are intended to reposition the education system to adequately play 
its role as a fundamental instrument for accelerating national development. So far the measures have not revived 
the education sector due to lack of adequate planning and poor implementation of the National Policy on 
Education (Adebayo, 2007). 
Basic services, such as education and health care facilities are the responsibilities of the government 
and are systematically failing the people who need them most (i.e. the citizens). Sound education and qualitative 
health care are all fundamental for human development and well-being. Yet as the National Bureau of Statistics 
(2010) demonstrated, the provision of these vital services are facing a lot of difficulties. For instance, funding is 
misappropriated, service providers do not report to work, building for schools and hospital equipment are in need 
of repair, basic materials for the provision of good health and teaching devices are missing.  
To this end, empirical evidence to justify or discredit the pursuit of fiscal decentralization in Nigeria is 
scant and  mixed. None of the claims on  either extreme, that fiscal decentralization retards the delivery of public 
service and has a variety of undesirable macroeconomic effects; or that it improves the delivery of public 
services and enhances economic growth has not been adequately examined, particularly using cross sectional 
data across the 36 states of the federation, hence this study.  
In order to put the study in the right perspective, the pertinent issue raised for investigation is, does 
fiscal decentralization improve or retard the productive and allocative efficiency of public service delivery? In 
this wise, the objective of this study is to assess empirically the influence of fiscal decentralization on public 
service delivery in Nigeria. 
The paper is organized into five section; in section one, we present a brief overview of the theoretical 
introduction, research problem, scope and plan underlying our study. Section two is devoted to the review of 
existing literature on the subject matter. Section three presents the theoretical framework and model specification 
while section four covered the empirical evidence of the nexus between fiscal decentralization and public service 
delivery on health and education in Nigeria, using Stata 10.0 software. Section five concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
In the literature, there is lack of consensus on the effects of fiscal decentralization on public service delivery; 
particularly in Nigeria. A school of thought argued that fiscal decentralization holds great promise in improving 
the delivery of public services (Alderman, 1998; Bardhan and Mookerjee, 2003; Eskeland and Filmer, 2002; 
Faguet 2001, Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2003). Some argued contrarily that devolution of revenue generating 
powers and expenditure responsibilities to states government lead to sub-optimal delivery of public services 
(Ravallion, 1998; Azfar and Livingston, 2002; and West and Wong, 1995), regrettably, neither side is able to 
substantiate its arguments convincingly with empirical evidence; others  argued that the nexus between fiscal 
decentralization and public service delivery is ambiguous and inconclusive (Azfar et. al. 2000; Khaleghian, 2003 
and Winkler and Rounds, 1996). In this respect, the section is structured into three segments; one segment deals 
with evidence from developed economies, another segment deals with evidence from developing economies, 
while the last segment deals with evidence from Nigeria economy.    
 
2.1 Evidence from Developed Economies 
Robalino, Picazo and Voetberg (2001) provide one of the few cross-country studies for industrial economies. In 
their study they regressed infant mortality on the ratio of expenditure managed by local governments relative to 
that managed by the central government. They also introduce a few control variables, which refer to institutional 
capacity, such as political, civil rights and corruption. These variables allow the authors to control the quality of 
political institutions. Without reference to the actual use of inputs, however, one cannot perform a thorough 
assessment of production efficiency with the partial exemption of GDP. The results showed that outcomes are 
positively correlated with decentralization. They also showed that the marginal effects of decentralization 
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diminish as GDP increases. This finding, if validated with other empirical evidence, would be an interesting 
result. It would mean that when countries grow, their institutional capacity increases and thus the advantages of 
decentralization are likely to vanish because the presumed differences between central and local government of 
public affairs disappear.  
Dunn and Wetzel (2001) examine the uneven progress on fiscal decentralization and key challenges to 
effective decentralization in the transition economies in Europe and Central Asia countries. They adopted a 
traditional approach that focuses on different structural elements that together make up a system of effective 
fiscal relations. The common measure of fiscal decentralization which is the share of sub-national spending in 
total government spending, on average about 25 percent among the transition countries, has varied from 15 
percent in Albania and Macedonia to over 50 percent in Russia and Kazakhstan. This standard however, fails to 
take into account the effective decision making authority of sub-national governments. It also does not take into 
account whether sub-national governments have the financial resources required to meet their assigned role of 
service delivery.  
Akai and Sakata (2004) analyze US state level panel data and found a negative influence of fiscal 
system on service delivery. The studies of Lessman (2006) and Akai and Sakata (2004) are synonymous but the 
main difference is that for the study of Lessman (2006) a panel data set of OECD countries was compiled, while 
Akai and Sakata 2004 used panel data of US states. Their approach has the advantage of analyzing relatively 
homogenous regions within the US state, perhaps the connection of fiscal decentralization and service delivery is 
US-country-specific and therefore, these results cannot be generalized for other countries. 
 
2.2 Evidence from Developing Economies 
Collins and Green (1994) Bardhan and Mookherjee (1998) and (2000) and Prud’homme; (1995), argue that 
decentralized systems, particularly those without well-functioning democratic systems, could lower local citizen 
welfare through a higher degree of corruption or leakage of resources than centralized systems. Some have 
argued that imperfections in local delivery of public service may offset the potential benefits of decentralization. 
Oates (1999) and Inman and Rubin-feld (1997) carried out a comprehensive review of the advantages and 
disadvantages of decentralization in the fiscal federalism literature. Fisman and Gatti (2000), using cross national 
data, found that fiscal decentralization is associated with lower levels of corruption, although no attempt is made 
to determine if the relationship is causal or simply associative. Other studies have split on the issue of 
decentralization and corruption. Wade (1997), using data from India, found that centralization was  associated 
with higher levels of corruption in the irrigation sector; Brueckner  (1999) found that corruption was more likely 
in local governments, in this regard, the benefits of decentralized service delivery system to the sub-national 
government will be completely eroded . 
Campbell (2001) highlights the extraordinary scope of authority and resources that have been 
decentralized throughout the region, and argues that this quiet revolution has generated a new model of 
governance based on innovative, capable leadership, high popular participation and a new implicit contract 
governing local taxation. Conversely, it was argued that the political motives of reformers often combine with 
vertical imbalances to make fiscal decentralization bad in terms of elite capture, regional inequality and 
macroeconomic stability. Rodriguez-Pose and Gill (2004) elaborated further on the tension between inequality 
and stability for the  case of Brazil, while Eskeland and  Filmer (2002) found econometric evidence that fiscal 
decentralization did lead to improvement in Argentine educational achievement scores. 
Casson and Obidzinki (2002) report that fiscal decentralization in Indonesia has spurred depredatory 
logging by bureaucratic actors with a stake in its proliferation.  The cross-country evidence of Martinez-Vazquez 
and McNab (2003) is similarly unhopeful, showing that we don’t know empirically whether fiscal 
decentralization affects the delivery of public service directly or indirectly and have no clear theoretical grounds 
for predicting a relationship either way. Worse, De Mello’s (2000a) in his study of 30 countries predicted that 
failures of intergovernmental fiscal coordination will lead to chronic deficits and eventually macroeconomic 
instability.  The studies of Sundar (2001) and Wiggins, Marfo and Anchirinah (2004) offered more cautious 
nuanced arguments that are on the whole skeptical about the possibility of beneficial change through 
decentralization. 
Shankar and Shah (2003) find a negative correlation between fiscal decentralization and service 
delivery on the basis of time series data of different developed and developing countries. The major flaws of this 
study is that for several countries the use of time series are very short and fiscal decentralization is not measured 
by financial accounts but only by a classification in unitary and federal states. Also, Kanbur and Zhang (2002) 
show that fiscal decentralization led to higher inequalities in the delivery of public services for Chinese during 
the period 1952-1999. That more fiscal decentralized countries have higher inequalities is concluded by Kim et. 
al. (2003), who analyzed Korean time series data.  
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2.3 Evidence from Nigerian Economy 
Okafor et. al. (1998) examine the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) as it affected access to essential social 
services, using health care in selected states as a case study. One of their major findings was that the rising cost 
of health care as well as the high cost of living engendered by the SAP adversely and significantly affected 
health-seeking behavior. They pointed out that in spite of a generally positive disposition to biomedical facilities 
among Nigerian consumers; the high cost of health care is generally driving many of them to alternative forms of 
medication, including self-medication. The results obtained by the authors from the focus group discussions in 
their study indicated that users of health care delivery services consider the cost of accessing them to be high. 
Specifically, 91 percent of the respondents opined that the cost of health care delivery services was neither 
moderate nor low. Fifty-two percent of them actually considered it to be high. This inhibited Nigerians’ use of 
hospital services. In fact, 57.8 percent of the respondents admitted a reduction in their use of health care services 
as a result of increased cost occasioned by the SAP. Responses obtained from the Okafor et. al. surveyed 
indicated that the cutback in the use of health care services stemmed not from a dislike of biomedical services as 
84 percent of respondents expressed preference for it. 
In Nigeria, a study of primary health care in the early 1990s revealed a complete lack of real 
participation in decision-making despite the devolution of responsibility to elected local officials. Local residents 
saw primary health care as unreliable, ineffective and unresponsive to their needs, while councilors were unclear 
about the health needs of their constituents and had little knowledge of health plans and activities (Crooks and 
Sverrisson, 2001). Robinson (2003) concluded  that greater emphasis should be given to measuring and 
monitoring service delivery outcomes under decentralized forms of provision, to ensure that participation 
produces real gains for the poor in terms of improved access and quality of services. 
Gupta, Gauri and Khemani (2003) carry out a study on decentralized delivery of primary health 
services in Nigeria using Lagos and Kogi away from original budget allocations. They found some evidence that 
active community participation in health service delivery may make staff more responsive to community health 
needs and increase the overall productivity of facilities. Communities were particularly active in making use of 
health services in Kogi State, whose population largely lives in rural areas and depends heavily on public 
institutions for service delivery. The most striking result is that community participation in Kogi is significantly 
associated with greater productivity per staff in providing in-patients deliveries, immunizations and out-patient 
consultation. 
The available literature highlighted some points, which must be noted, the first is that, the question of 
whether or not fiscal decentralization improve or retard the productive and allocative efficiency of public service 
delivery remains open empirically; therefore, the solution to this question remain an empirical one. In addition, 
there is no consensus on the significance of the available results. In the same vein, the policy implications of 
cross-countries regression analysis are somewhat discouraging and cannot be used for the generalization of the 
country specific-effects of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and public service delivery. This is 
partly due to methodological flaws and how to deal with problem of endogeneity of some of the explanatory 
variables; thus, further analyses are still called for. In this regard, the subsequent sections of this study will 
provide evidence at filling these empirical gaps, which is rare in Nigeria, to the best of our knowledge. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework and Model Specification 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
The study is situated on Keynesian macroeconomic theory developed by Musgrave, R. (1959). Musgrave 
framework delineated three core government functions which includes stabilization, distribution and allocative 
function. This study is in line with the allocative function of Public finance of Keynesian Macroeconomic theory 
developed by Richard Musgrave with the strong perception that federal government are in the best position to 
undertake stabilization and distributive function while economic theorist argued that states government are in the 
best position to undertake allocative function because the preferences for particular services differs across states 
and by locality. 10 Thus, an easy theoretical framework employed by Elhiraika (2007)  is employed in this study, 
the government is assumed to choose levels of education (E), health expenditure (H) and other revenue (O) in 
order to maximize a social welfare function. The government maximizes a general welfare function of the form;  
         
    U(Ei, Hi, Oi )                                             (1) 
 
Where U(E, H, O ) is the objective function, subject to the budget constraint 
 
 
        Ei + Hi + Oi = Ri                                             (2) 
 
Where R is states government revenue, which consists of: 
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           Ri= IGRi+ TRi + ORi                                             (3) 
 
Where IGRi is internally generated revenue, TRi is the transfer from federal government (statutory allocation), 
and ORi is the revenue from other sources including borrowing (domestic and foreign). The marginal utilities of 
Education (UE), Health (UH) and other services (UO) are assumed to satisfy the first-order conditions: i.e. the 
partial differentiation of U with respect to E, H and O equals zero: 
           UE = UH = UO      = 0                                              (4)   
It is assumed that states governments utilized the revenue generated internally plus statutory allocation and 
borrowing from different sources to finance the delivery of public services to their citizens. This can be written 
as; 
 
       Ei + Hi + Oi = IGRi + TRi + ORi                               (5)                             
 
The social welfare function is assumed to have the usual properties of strict quasi-concavity such that the 
second-order conditions are: UEE < 0, UHH < 0, UOO, UEEUOO > 0, UHHUOO > 0. UEE, UHH, UOO are the second 
order partial derivatives. Accordingly, we can write the equations  as: 
 
         E = E (RP)                                                               (6) 
 
         H = H (RP)                                                              (7) 
 
Where RP is the predetermined component of R (such as transfers). Assuming that E and H are normal goods, 
demand for education and health is expected to vary positively with R. And to the extent that the state and local 
governments action can determine revenue levels, R will be endogenous. This is particularly true for IGR. 
However, if states governments’ internally generated revenue, particularly the tax base and tax rate, are fixed by 
the federal government, then IGR will be exogenous. The degree of endogeneity will depend on the freedom 
given to states government to determine tax rate and tax base. Normally, states government determine the tax 
rate and tax base within certain limits. 
At this juncture, it is important to develop an empirical model in order to sort out the important factors 
and behaviors’ at play in determining qualitative decentralized service delivery and to aid in interpretation of the 
empirical results. In particular, we are interested in determining whether fiscal decentralization necessarily 
implies higher or lower relative levels of public service delivery. The model for testing this unsettled argument 
will be specified by expressing E as access to education and primary school net enrolment ratio, while H is 
expressed as access to health and fully vaccinated children in state i, IGR is the share of internally generated 
revenue, TR is the share of transfer from federal government, OR is the revenue from other sources including 
borrowing (domestic and foreign), µ is the stochastic disturbance term. The relative performance of these 
variables would then determine whether or not the unsettled argument in the theoretical modeling would be 
empirically resolved. 
 
3.2 Model Specification 
The model was estimated by OLS, using Stata 10.0 software estimator, some relevant variables (federal transfer 
and internally generated revenue) will be omitted one after the order to ascertain their effects on the regression 
results. Thus, omitting relevant fiscal decentralization variables could cause a mixed or ambiguous relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and service delivery. Therefore, to correct for this omitted variables bias in this 
study, we included relevant fiscal decentralization and service delivery variables. In order to account for the real 
effects of fiscal decentralized system in our model, we include Y which is states’ GDP and HDI which is human 
development index. As indicated previously, the demand for education and health will depend on income, the 
level of development, and the factors determining R; thus, the education and health equations are; 
 
  Ei=α1+α2IGRi+α3TRi+α4ORi+α5Yi+α6HDIi+µi                          (6) 
The specification for health is; 
  Hit=β1+β2IGRi+β3TRi+β4ORi+β5Yi+Β6HDIi+µ                           (7) 
Where Y is states’ GDP, IGR is internally generated revenue; TR is the transfers from federal government, OR is 
other revenue (borrowings and loans) and µ  is the stochastic disturbance term. The focus of this study is to 
establish the link between fiscal decentralization and public service delivery in Nigeria.  
In this regard, by rearranging equations  (6) and (7), differencing with respect to time and taking log in 
order to have a base line model for our estimate, then equations (6) and (7) becomes: 
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  lnEi=α1+α2lnIGRi+α3lnTRi+α4lnORi+α5slnYi+α6lnHDIi+µi         (8) 
        
  lnHi=β1+β2lnIGRi+β3lnTRi+β4lnORi+β5lnYi+β6lnHDIi+µi          (9)  
 
Where i denotes cross-sectional dimension of the data used; the existing studies especially on developing 
countries relied on the standard Barro (1990) and Futagami et. al. (1993) procedure. This method appears to be 
popular and yield satisfactory results, its unpredictability in the signs of some of the important comparative static 
derivatives by interpolating the corresponding results might lead to spurious regression. Thus, the model to be 
adopted is of the form; 
           
lnEi=α1+α2lnIGRi+α3lnTRi+α4lnORi+α5lnYi+α6lnHDIi +µi              (10) 
 
 The health specification is; 
 
lnHi=β1+β2lnIGRi+β3lnTRi+β4lnORi+β5lnYi+ β6lnHDIi +µi           (11)  
 
4. Effects of Fiscal Decentralization on Health and Educational Service Delivery 
At this juncture, we now turn to an econometric estimation of the relationship between fiscal decentralization 
and public service delivery. We approached the estimation with a cross sectional set of 36 states across the 
federation including federal capital territory. Table 1 and Table 2 were estimated with access to education and 
primary school net enrolment as their dependent variables respectively while Table 3 and Table 4 were estimated 
with the access to health and fully vaccinated children rate as their dependent variables respectively. The first 
three column of these tables (Table 1, 2, 3 and 4) were estimated without using states’ dummy variable, while 
the second three column of these table were estimated with the inclusion of dummy variable.  
The model were estimated using cross sectional data for the 36 states of the federation including FCT, 
the use of this type of data is preferable as it can account for differences across states. Estimation is by Stata 10.0 
software, the dependent variables are health and education access, primary school enrolment ratio and fully 
vaccinated children ratio. Standard errors are in square brackets and ‘t’ value are in parenthesis. The explanatory 
variables are displayed sequentially ranging from (Ltr) federal transfers, (Ligr) internally generated revenue, 
(Lor) other revenue, (Ly) States’ GDP, (Lhdi) human development index with constant term at the bottom of the 
table.  
The econometric findings on the effects of fiscal decentralization on public service delivery are 
presented in the tables below; nevertheless, the findings of the estimated models are interpreted with caution 
because of high degree of correlation between internally generated revenue and federal transfer, the two 
variables are entered separately. They turned out to have different effects in the educational service delivery as 
well as in the health service delivery. It is pertinent to state that the results of internally generated revenue (igr) 
and intergovernmental transfers (tr), determine the ability of states government to meet their expenditure 
responsibilities. Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 were estimated with the omission of federal transfer variables in column 2 
and 5, and omission of internally generated revenue in column 3 and 6. Additionally, States dummy variable 
(dstate) were included among the regressors in each estimations to determine whether there is positive link 
between the fiscal resources devolved to the oil producing states and their level of service delivery. 
 
4.1 Empirical results 
Operationally, we used cross sectional data with dependent variables for education service estimations; access to 
education estimated in Table 1 and primary school net enrolment ratio estimated in Table 2; while dependent 
variables for health service are access to health  and fully vaccinated children ratio estimated in Tables 3 and 4 
respectively. The system generates a separate constant coefficient for each regression equation, the estimations 
were carried out by Stata 10.0 software.  
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Table 1.  Dependent variable: Access to education (Ledu) 
Explanatory 
variables 
Without states’ dummies With states’ dummies 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Ltr 
.4396 
[.1848] 
(2.3)* 
 .4454 
[.1879] 
(2.37)* 
.1430 
[.2248] 
(0.64) 
 
 
.1683 
[.2310] 
(0.73) 
 
Ligr 
.1161 
[.0806] 
(1.44) 
.1202 
[.0864] 
(1.39) 
 .1290 
[.0766] 
(1.69) 
.1322 
[.0756] 
(1.75) 
 
 
Lor 
.0461 
[.0744] 
(-0.62) 
-.0380 
[.0797] 
(-0.48) 
-.0116 
[.0717] 
(-0.16) 
-.0700 
[.0714] 
(-0.98) 
-.0730 
[.0705] 
(-1.03) 
-.0305 
[.0695] 
(-0.44) 
 
Ly 
-.1680 
[.0855] 
(-1.96) 
-.0465 
[.0736] 
(-0.63) 
-.1228 
[.0809] 
(-1.52) 
-.1273 
[.0833] 
(-1.53) 
-.0957 
[.0661] 
(-1.45) 
-.0801 
[.0808] 
(-0.99) 
 
Lhdi 
.4383 
[.3361] 
(1.30) 
.2767 
[.3530] 
(0.78) 
.4030 
[.3410] 
(1.18) 
.5666 
[.3242] 
(1.75) 
.5590 
[.3207] 
(1.74) 
.5193 
[.3327] 
(1.56) 
 
Dstate 
 
------- 
 
------- 
 
------- 
.4192 
[.1993] 
(2.10)* 
.4987 
[.1536] 
(3.25)* 
.3922 
[.2046] 
(1.92) 
 
Constant 
1.7738 
[1.3906] 
(1.28) 
4.5802 
[.7904] 
(5.80) 
1.7736 
[1.4145] 
(1.25) 
4.4412 
[1.8284] 
(2.43) 
5.5007 
[.7470) 
(7.36] 
4.2697 
[1.8807] 
(2.27) 
R2 0.2197 0.0723 0.1656 0.3230 0.3135 0.2567 
Adjusted R2 0.0896 0.0474 0.0580 0.1829 0.1328 0.1328 
Prob > F 0.1677 0.6624 0.2155 0.0609 0.0968 0.0968 
Notes: Standard errors are in square brackets and ‘t’ values are in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate 
significance at 5% level.  
We open the discussion with the results, on Table 1 which displays the results of the regressions of 
educational service delivery on explanatory variables with and without states’ dummy variable. In Column 1, 
among the sets only federal transfer demonstrates a significant association with service delivery on education 
based on the regression analysis (without the dummy variable). 
In column 1, of Table 1, access to education was regressed on other explanatory variables; in the 
estimated equations, dummy variable was not included. Evidently in Table 1 column 1, among these set, the 
coefficient of federal transfer bears a significant association at 5% level of significance, suggesting a strong and 
positive link between fiscal decentralization and access to educational service delivery. This result is aligned 
with the propositions of the theoretical debate discussed in the literature. Thus, the interpretation of the slope co-
efficient (.4396) of federal transfer is that assuming federal transfer increases by a unit, which is billion naira; 
accessibility to education on the average increases or improves by 44%. Also, in column 1, the co-efficient 
(.1161) of internally generated revenue, implies that a unit change in internally generated revenue which is in 
billion, decreased the rate of access to education service by 12%. Thus, increased fiscal resources (statutory 
allocations) to states government would generate increased access to education service delivery as measured by 
access to education on the average increases by 44%.       
Focusing on the rest of the explanatory variables, we observe that coefficients of other revenue (i.e. 
grants, loans and borrowings) bears negative sign and is statistically equal to zero, indicating that loans, grants 
and borrowings exert a negative impact on access to educational service delivery based on the results. In 
contrast, transfer from the federal government has positive coefficient and is significant by 5% levels of 
significance. These results may be explained by the beneficial effects of internal and external constraints on the 
function of governments. Finally, based on the results, federal transfer appeared to be the main determinant of 
access to educational service delivery. 
In column 2, of Table 1, we re-estimated the model using federal transfer as an omitted variable. The 
dependent variable still remain the same. The slope coefficient (.1202) of internally generated revenue connotes 
that a unit increase, which is billion naira for the internally generated revenue, decrease on the average the 
accessibility of citizens to educational service by (12%).  
In column 3 of Table 1, we regressed the model by omitting internally generated revenue, the slope co-
efficient (.4454) of federal transfer, indicates that a unit increase in federal transfer which is billion of naira, 
changes and improves on the average by (45%) accessible ways to educational facilities. Since federal transfer is 
the only significant coefficient among the explanatory variables, this show that positive link exists between 
federal transfer and access to educational services. 
In column 4, 5 and 6. we re-estimated the model using access to education as a dependent variable 
while other explanatory variables are still remain the same. Dummy variable was included in order to examine 
the difference in the educational service of oil and non-oil producing states. In column 4, the slope coefficient 
(.4192) is positive and statistically significance, a unit change or increase in the excess share from crude oil to oil 
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producing states generates additional (42%) citizens accessibility to educational service delivery which is 
measured by access to education. 
Column 5 of Table 1 demonstrated the expected result for the co-efficient of the dummy variable. In 
column 5, the co-efficient (.4987) is significantly and positively related to education service which is measured 
by access to education. the interpretation of the slope coefficient is that a unit increase in the share of excess 
crude oil revenue accruing to oil producing states is positively correlated with their citizens accessibility to 
education service delivery by (50%). 
Table 2.  Dependent variable: Primary school net enrolment (Lpne) 
Explanatory 
variables 
Without states’ dummies With states’ dummies 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Ltr 
.3737 
[.1668] 
(2.24)* 
 .3788 
[.1696] 
(2.23)* 
.1130 
[.2037] 
(0.55) 
 .1358 
[.2092] 
(0.65) 
 
Ligr 
.1046 
[.0727] 
(1.44) 
.1081 
[.0773] 
(1.40) 
 .1159 
[.0694] 
(1.67) 
.1185 
[.0684] 
(1.73) 
 
 
Lor 
-.0229 
[.0672] 
(-0.34) 
-.0161 
[.0713] 
(-0.23) 
.0081 
[.0647] 
(0.12) 
-.0440 
[.0647] 
(-0.68) 
-.0464 
[.0638] 
(-0.73) 
-.0085 
[.0629] 
(-0.14) 
 
Ly 
-.1495 
[.0771] 
(-1.94) 
-.0463 
[-0.658] 
(-0.70) 
-.1089 
[.0731] 
(-1.49) 
-.1138 
[.0755] 
(-1.51) 
-.0888 
[.0598] 
(-1.48) 
-.0714 
[.0732] 
(-0.98) 
 
Lhdi 
.4260 
[.3034] 
(1.40) 
.2886 
[.3158] 
(0.91) 
.3941 
[.3077] 
(1.28) 
.5386 
[.2938] 
(1.83) 
.5327 
[.2902] 
(1.84) 
.4962 
[.3013] 
(1.65) 
 
Dstate 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
.3683 
[.1806] 
(2.04)* 
.4312 
[.1390] 
(3.10)* 
.3441 
[.1853] 
(1.86) 
 
Constant 
2.9158 
[1.2552] 
(2.32) 
5.3010 
[.7070] 
(7.50) 
2.9157 
[1.2767] 
(2.28) 
5.2593 
[1.6571] 
(3.17) 
6.0968 
[.6759] 
(9.02) 
5.1053 
[1.7032] 
(3.00) 
        R2 0.2115 0.0795 0.1571 0.3104 0.3031 0.2440 
Adjusted R2 0.0800 0.0393 0.0483 0.1677 0.1869 0.1180 
Prob > F 0.1880 0.6182 0.2430 0.0746 0.0449 0.1176 
Notes: Standard errors are in square brackets and ‘t’ values are in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate 
significance at 5%  level.  
In Table 2, we regressed primary education net enrolment rate on other explanatory variables. In 
column 1, the coefficient (.3737) of federal transfer is positive and statistically different from zero as compared 
to the co-efficient (.1046) of internally generated revenue which is positive but statistically insignificant. The 
slope coefficient (.3737) of federal transfer is assumed that a unit change in federal transfer which is billion 
naira, there would be a corresponding positive changes by (37%) in the primary school net enrolment rate. More 
so, the slope co-efficient (.1046) of internally generated revenue indicates that a unit change in the internally 
generated revenue would cause a decreased by (10%)  in the net primary school enrolment rate.  
In column 2 , we re-estimated the model using federal transfer as an omitted variable while in column 
3 we used internally generated revenue as an omitted variable. When these variables were omitted for instance in 
column 2, the slope co-efficient (.1081) of internally generated revenue is statistically insignificant and 
negatively correlated with education service delivery measured by primary school net enrolment ratio. This 
means a unit change in internally generated  revenue caused a decrease of (11%) in primary school net enrolment 
ratio. This is an indication that no state within the federation can survive without collecting federal allocations 
based on the result. In column 3, a unit change in federal transfer resulted into (38%) increases in the net 
enrolment for primary education. 
The inclusion of dummy variable on column 4 and 5, of Table 2 brought about positive and significant 
co-efficient. The slope co-efficient (.3683) and (.4312) of dummy co-efficient in column 4 and 5, means that a 
1% increases in the share of excess crude oil revenue accruing to oil producing states on the average increase the 
net enrolment ratio for primary education by (37%) and (43%). This means that oil producing states do more in 
term of educational service delivery as compared to non-oil producing states. 
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Table 3.  Dependent variable: Access to health facilities (Lhel) 
Explanatory 
variables 
Without states’ dummies With states’ dummies 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Ltr 
-.3314 
 [.1543] 
(-2.15)* 
 -.3259 
[.1585] 
(-2.06)* 
-.2353 
[.1996] 
(-1.18) 
 -.2143 
[.2040] 
(-1.05) 
 
Ligr 
.1110 
[.0673] 
(1.65) 
.1079 
[.0711] 
(1.52) 
 .1069 
[.0680] 
(1.57) 
.1015 
[.0683] 
(1.49) 
 
 
Lor 
-.0166 
[.0622] 
(-0.27) 
-.0227 
[.0656] 
(-0.35) 
.0163 
[.0605] 
(0.27) 
.0089 
[.0634] 
(-0.14) 
-.0040 
[.0637] 
(-0.06) 
.0239 
[.0613] 
(0.39) 
 
Ly 
0.637 
[.0714] 
(0.89) 
-.0278 
[.0606] 
(-0.46) 
.1069 
[.0683] 
(1.56) 
.0506 
[.0740] 
(0.68) 
-.0015 
[.0597] 
(-0.03) 
.0897 
[.0713] 
(1.26) 
 
Lhdi 
.0821 
[.2808] 
(0.29) 
.2040 
[.2906] 
(0.70) 
.0483 
[.2877] 
(0.17) 
.0406 
[.2879] 
(0.14) 
.0531 
[.2895] 
(0.18) 
.0015 
[.2937] 
(0.01) 
 
Dstate 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
-.1358 
[.1770] 
(-0.77) 
-.2667 
[.1387] 
(-1.92) 
-.1581 
[.1806] 
(-0.87) 
 
Constant 
6.9493 
[1.1618] 
(5.98) 
4.8340 
[.6505] 
(7.43) 
6.9492 
[1.1936] 
(5.82) 
6.0854 
[1.6236] 
(3.75) 
4.3418 
[.6744] 
(6.44) 
5.9434 
[1.6604] 
(3.58) 
        R2 0.2034 0.0810 0.1312 0.2193 0.1819 0.1528 
Adjusted R2 0.0707 0.0375 0.0191 0.0578 0.0455 0.0116 
Prob > F 0.2096 0.3327 0.3430 0.2646 0.2770 0.3902 
Notes: Standard errors are in square brackets and ‘t’ values are in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate 
significance at 5% level.  
In Table 3, access to health facilities was used as a dependent variable with other explanatory variables 
still remain the same. The estimations were run with and without states dummy variables. In column 1 and 3 the 
slope coefficient (-.3314) and (-.3259) of federal transfer implying that for a 1% increase in the federal transfer 
from federal government to states government, health service delivery measured by access to health facilities on 
the average decreased by about (33%) and (33%) in column 1 and 3 respectively. 
The co-efficient (.1110) and (.1079) of internally generated revenue in column 1 and 2 respectively, 
connotes that a unit change in the internally generated revenue, bring about decrease of  about (11%) and (11%) 
in the health service delivery measured by access to health care facilities.  
The introduction of dummy variable in column 4, 5 and 6 yielded negative coefficients of (-.1358), (-
.2667) and (-.1581). This implies that a 1% increase in the share of excess crude oil to states government 
generate a decrease of (14%,) (27%) and (16%) in the accessibility of qualitative health care delivered to the 
people. 
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Table 4.  Dependent variable: fully vaccinated children (Lfvc) 
Explanatory 
variables 
Without states’ dummies With states’ dummies 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Ltr 
.9058 
[.4738] 
(1.91) 
 .9415 
[.4801] 
(1.96) 
.7303 
[.6047] 
(1.21) 
 .8003 
[.6121] 
(1.31) 
 
Ligr 
.2803 
[.2031] 
(1.38) 
.3014 
[.2116] 
(1.42) 
 .2867 
[.2063 
(1.39 
.3075 
[.2072] 
(1.48) 
 
 
Lor 
.1424 
[.1923] 
(0.74) 
.1805 
[.1995] 
(0.90) 
.2136 
[.1880] 
(1.14) 
.1256 
[.1981] 
(0.63) 
.1189 
[.1995] 
(0.60) 
.2013 
[.1935] 
(1.04) 
 
Ly 
-.4943 
[.2145] 
(-2.30) 
-.2676 
[.1866] 
(-1.43) 
-.3830 
[.2018] 
(-1.90) 
-.4685 
[.2240] 
(-2.09) 
-.3137 
[.1852] 
(-1.69) 
-.3601 
[.2134] 
(-1.69) 
 
Lhdi 
1.0663 
[.8805] 
(1.21) 
.8705 
[.9124] 
(0.95) 
.9286 
[.8879] 
(1.05) 
1.1321 
[.9030] 
(1.25) 
1.1336 
[.9101] 
(1.25) 
.9792 
[.9105] 
(1.08) 
 
Dstate 
 
------- 
 
------- 
 
------- 
.2552 
[.5341] 
(0.48) 
.6472 
[.4275] 
(1.51) 
.2061 
[.5415] 
(0.38) 
 
Constant 
-1.3401 
[3.5879] 
(-0.37) 
4.5381 
[1.9302] 
(2.35) 
-1.5252 
[3.6390] 
(-0.42) 
.2416 
[4.9181] 
(0.05) 
5.6604 
[2.0301] 
(2.79) 
-.2510 
[4.9835] 
(-0.05) 
        R2 0.2255 0.1279 0.1747 0.2318 0.1918 0.1788 
Adjusted R2 0.0920 0.0116 0.0646 0.0672 0.0524 0.0372 
Prob > F 0.1688 0.3747 0.2033 0.2465 0.2621 0.3065 
Notes: Standard errors are in square brackets and ‘t’ values are in parenthesis.  
In Table 4, fully vaccinated children was used as a measure for health service delivery, other 
explanatory variables are still remain the same. The co-efficient (.9058) and (.9415) of federal transfer in column 
1 and 3 bear insignificant relationship with the rate of fully vaccinated children, likewise the coefficients (.2803) 
and (.3014) of internally generated revenue are statistically equal to zero. This means that the relationship 
between federal transfer, internally generated  revenue and health service delivery measured by the ratio of fully 
vaccinated children is negative. Additionally, the inclusion of dummy variables in column 4, 5 and 6 had 
insignificant co-efficient and they are statistically insignificant. The dummy variable coefficient (.2252), (.6472) 
and (.2061), connotes that a unit change in the share of excess crude oil revenue to oil producing states generate 
reduction of about (23%), (65%) and (21%) in the health service delivery measured by fully vaccinated children.  
In summary, the results displayed that intergovernmental transfers (TR), determine the ability of states 
government to meet their expenditure (health and education) responsibilities. Starting with educational equation, 
it was observed that the coefficient (.4396) and (.4454) of the federal transfer are statistically significant, 
likewise the coefficient (.4192) and (4987) of dummy variables are all positive and statistically different from 
zero. Contrarily, the coefficient (-.3314) and (-.3259) of federal transfer and that of dummy variable (-.1358) (-
.2667) and (-.1581) appeared to be negative for health related indicators. The regression results concluded that 
there is positive effects of fiscal decentralization on educational service delivery while there is negative 
relationship between health service delivery and fiscal decentralization in Nigeria.   
 
5. Conclusion 
Our findings are; that fiscal decentralization has positive link with educational service delivery, while high 
degree of fiscal decentralization is negatively related to health care delivery. However, our analysis is more 
satisfactory from an econometric perspective; thus, the results of this work indicate that there is heavy 
dependence of states government on federal transfer from the federal government in Nigeria, this suggests that 
the benefits from fiscal decentralization in terms of improved service delivery due to enhanced transparency and 
accountability to the citizens are likely to be limited. The intergovernmental transfer system makes states 
government more accountable to federal government and hence the design of federal fiscal policy standards is 
critical and more important than accountability to the citizens.  
 
References  
Adebayo, L. (2007), “A Cybernetics Appraisal of Reforms in the Educational Sector”, In Nigeria’s reform 
program: Issues and Challenges. Nigeria: Vantage Press. 
Akai, N & Sakata, M. (2004), “Fiscal Decentralization, Commitment and Regional Inequality: Evidence from 
States level”, Cross discussion paper F-315. 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.9, 2015 
 
118 
Alderman, H. (1998),”Social Assistance in Albania: Decentralization and Targeted Transfers”, LSMS Working 
paper No. 134, World Bank, Washington D.C. 
Antonis, W., Manthos, D. & Kammas, P. (2008), “Fiscal Decentralization and Public Sector Efficiency: 
Evidence From OECD Countries”, Cesifo Working Paper, No 2364. 
Anyawu, J.C. (1999), “Fiscal Relations among the various tiers of Government in Nigeria”, in Fiscal Federalism 
and Nigeria’s Economic Development. Selected papers of the 40th Annual Conference of the Nigerian 
Economic Society. 
Azfar, O., Gurgur, T., Kahkonen, S., Lanyi, A. & Meagher, P. (2000), “Conditions for Effective Decentralized 
Governance: An Empirical Investigation of Public Service Delivery in the Philippines”, IRIS, 
University of Maryland.   
Azfar, O. & Livingston, J. (2002), “Federalist Disciplines or Local Capture? An Empirical Analysis of 
Decentralization in Uganda”. IRIS Working Paper, 256. University of Maryland. 
Bardhan, P. & Mookherjee, D. (1998), “Expenditure Decentralization and the Delivery of Public Services in 
Developing Countries”, Working Paper, C98-104. Center for International and Development 
Economics Research Berkeley, Calif. 
Bardhan, P. & Mookherjee, D. (2000), “Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels”, American 
Economic Review, Vol. 90(2),135-139. 
Bardhan, P. & Mookherjee, D. (2003), “Poverty Alleviation Effort of West Bengal Panchayats”, 
http//econ.bu.edu/dilipm/wkpap.htm/epwsumm.pdf   
Barro, R. J. (1990), “Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth”, Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 98, S103- S125. 
Brueckner, J. K. (1999), “Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries: The Effects of Local Corruption and 
Tax evasion”,  Annals of Economics and Finance, Vol.1(1), 1-18. 
Campbell, T. (2001), “The Quiet Revolution: The Rise of Political Participation and Leading Cities with 
Decentralization in Latin America and the Caribbean”, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Casson, A. & Obizinki, K. (2002), “From New Order to Regional Autonomy: Shifting Dynamics of Illegal 
Logging in Kalimantan, Indonesia”, World Development, 30:2133-2151. 
Central Bank of Nigeria, (1999). “Nigeria’s Development Prospects: Poverty Assessment and Alleviation 
Study”, Abuja: Central Bank Nigeria, Research Department. 
Collins, C. & Green, A. (1994), “ Decentralization and Primary Health Care: Some negative Implications in 
Developing countries”, International Journal of Health Services,  24 (3): 459-475 . 
Crook, R.C. & Sverrison, A.S. (2001), “Decentralization and Poverty Alleviation in Developing Countries: A 
Comparative Analysis of West Bengal unique”. Institute of Development Studies Working Paper  
(130).  
De Mello, L. (2000a), “ Fiscal Decentralization and Intergovernmental Relations: A cross-country Analysis”. 
World Development, (28),  pp. 365-380 
Dunn, J. & Wetzel, D. (2001), “Fiscal Decentralization in Former Socialist Economies:Progress and Prospects”, 
Proceedings of the Ninety-Second Annual Conference on Taxation. Washington, DC: National Tax 
Association, pp. 242-250.  
Elhiraika, A. (2007), “Fiscal Decentralization and Public Service Delivery in South Africa”, Working Paper 
African Trade Policy Centre, Economic Commission for Africa. pp. 6-8. 
Eboh, E. (2009), “Fiscal Federalism, Sub-National Governance and MDG’s in Nigeria”, African Institute for 
Applied Economics, Research paper (4), pp. 18-22. 
Enikolopov, R. & Zhuravskaya, E. (2007), “Decentralization and Political  Institutions”,  Journal of Public 
Economics, 91: 2261-2290.   
Eskeland, G. & Filmer, D. (2002), “Autonomy, Participation and Learning in Argentina Schools: Findings and 
their Implications for Decentralization”, Policy Research Working Paper, (2766), World Bank, 
Washington, D.C. 
Faguet, J.P. (2001), “ Does Decentralization Increase Responsiveness to Local  needs? Evidence from Bolivia”, 
Policy Research working paper, 2516. World Bank, Washington D.C.  
Futagami, K., Morita, Y., & Shibata, A. (1993), “Dynamic Analysis of an Endogenous Growth Model with 
Public Capital”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol.(95), pp. 607-625. 
Gupta, M.D., Gauri, V. & Khemani, S. (2003), “Decentralized Delivery of Primary Health Services in Nigeria: 
Survey Evidence from the States of Lagos and Kogi”, Working Paper Series. Washington, D.C. 
IHDR, (2001). Putting People first: A compact for regional Integration.  Indonesian Human Development 
Report, Indonesia: UNDP.  
Jutting, J., Corsi, E. & Stockmayer, A. (2005), “Decentralization and Poverty Reduction”, OECD Policy 
Insights, 5, January. 
Kanbur, R. & Zhang, X. (2002), “Fifty years of Regional Inequality in China: A journey through Revolution, 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.9, 2015 
 
119 
Reform and Openness”, CEPR Discussion paper, 2887 
Kim, E., Hong, S.W., & Ha, S. J. (2003), “The Impact of National Development and Decentralization Policies on 
Regional Income Disparity in Korea”, Annals of Regional Science, 37(1) 79-91. 
Kimenyi, M.S. & Shughart W. F. (2006), “Provider Competition, Marketization and the Quality of Public 
Service Provision. African Economic Research Consortium, Collaborative Project on Service Delivery 
in Africa Framework Paper : pp. 1-2. 
Khaleghian, P. (2003),  “Decentralization and Public Services: The Case of Immunization”, Social Science and 
Medicine, 59:1 pp.163-183.    
Lessman, C. (2006), “Fiscal Decentralization and Regional Disparity: A Panel Data Approach for OECD 
countries”,  Ifo working papers, 25. 
Martinez-Vazquez, J. & McNab, R. (2003). “Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth”, World 
Development, 31, (9) Spring: 1597-1616 
Musgrave, R. A. (1959), “The Theory of Public Finance”,  New York: Mcgraw-Hill Book Company.  
NBS, (2010), “National Bureau of Statistics on Core Welfare Indicators for Nigeria.  
NPC, (2007a), “ National Planning Commission, for Nigeria Millennium Development Goals 2006 Report, 
Abuja, Nigeria. 
Oates, W.E. (1999), “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism,” Journal of Economic Literature, 37(3), pp. 1120-49. 
Obadan, M.I. & Edo, S. E. (2004), “Overall Economic Direction, Strategy and Performance”. In I. B. Bello-
Imam, & M.I. Obadan (Eds.), Anthology of Democratic Governance and Development Management in 
Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, 1999-2003, Ibadan, Nigeria HEB, Plc. 
Okafor, S.I., Abumere, S.I., Egunjobi, L. & Ekpeyong, D. B. (1998), “Structural Adjustment and Access to 
essential Social services; A case study of Health Care Services in selected states” NISER/SSCN 
National Research Network on liberation policies,  Nigeria, pp. 2-48. 
Okojie, C. (2009), “Decentralization and Public Service Delivery in Nigeria”, NSSP Background Paper, No.4.,  
pp. 1-3. 
Prud’homme, R. (1995), “The Dangers of Decentralization,” The World Bank Research Observer, 10(2), pp. 
201-220.   
Ravallion, M. & Galasso, E. (1998), “Reaching Poor Areas in a Federal System”, Policy Reseach Working 
Paper, 1901. World Bank, Washington DC. 
Robalino, D., Picazo, O. & Voetberg, A. (2001), “Does Fiscal Decentralization Improve the Health Outcomes? 
Evidence from Cross-Country Analysis”, Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2565, World Bank.                   
Robinson, M. (2003), “Participation, Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery. Paper Presented at 
the Workshop on New Approaches to Decentralized Service Delivery, held in Santiago, March 16-20, 
Chile.  
Rodriquez-Pose, A & Gill, N. (2004), “Reassessing Relations between the Centre and the States: The challenge 
for the Brazilian Administration”. Regional Studies, 38: 833-844.   
Rubinfeld, D. & Inman, R. (1997), “Rethinking Federalism”. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, pp. 43-
64. 
Shah, A., Thompson, T. & Zou, H. (2004), “The Impact of Decentralization on Service Delivery, Corruption, 
Fiscal Management and Growth in Developing and Emerging Market Economies: A Synthesis of 
Empirical Evidence”, Cesifo DICE Report, 1/2004. 
Shankar, R. & Shah, A. (2003), “Bridging the Economic divide with countries: A Score-Card on the 
Performance of Regional Policies in Reducing Regional Income Disparities”,World Development, 31,( 
8), 1421-1441. 
Sundar, N. (2001), “Is Devolution Democratization?” World Development, 29, 2007-2023. 
Tanzi, V. & Schuknect, L. (1998), “Can Small Governments Secure Economic and Social Well-Being?” In H. 
Grubel, (Ed.), How to Spend Fiscal Dividend: What is the Optimal Size of Government? Vancouver: 
Fraser Institute. 
Wade, R. (1997), “How Infrastructure Agencies Motivate staff: Canal Irrigation in India and the Republic of 
Korea”, In A. Mody (Ed.), Infrastructure Strategies in East Asia. Washington DC: World Bank. 
West, L., & Wong, C. (1995), “Fiscal Decentralization and Growth Regional Disparities in Rural China: Some 
Evidence in the Provision of Social Services”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 11(4): 70-84. 
Wiggins, S., Marfo. K. & Anchirinah, V. (2004), “Protecting the Forest or the People? Environmental Policies 
and Livelihoods in the Forest Margins of Southern Ghana”, World Development, 32: 1939-1955.  
Winkler, D. & Rounds, T. (1996), “Municipal and Private Sector Response to Decentralization and School 
Choice”, Economics of Education Review. 15(4): 365-376. 
World Bank, (1996), “Nigeria: Federal Public Expenditure Review. Report No. 14447-UNI. Washington DC. 
World Bank, (2005), “Making Services Work for Poor People”, Washington D.C., World Bank. 
The IISTE is a pioneer in the Open-Access hosting service and academic event management.  
The aim of the firm is Accelerating Global Knowledge Sharing. 
 
More information about the firm can be found on the homepage:  
http://www.iiste.org 
 
CALL FOR JOURNAL PAPERS 
There are more than 30 peer-reviewed academic journals hosted under the hosting platform.   
Prospective authors of journals can find the submission instruction on the following 
page: http://www.iiste.org/journals/  All the journals articles are available online to the 
readers all over the world without financial, legal, or technical barriers other than those 
inseparable from gaining access to the internet itself.  Paper version of the journals is also 
available upon request of readers and authors.  
 
MORE RESOURCES 
Book publication information: http://www.iiste.org/book/ 
Academic conference: http://www.iiste.org/conference/upcoming-conferences-call-for-paper/  
 
IISTE Knowledge Sharing Partners 
EBSCO, Index Copernicus, Ulrich's Periodicals Directory, JournalTOCS, PKP Open 
Archives Harvester, Bielefeld Academic Search Engine, Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek 
EZB, Open J-Gate, OCLC WorldCat, Universe Digtial Library , NewJour, Google Scholar 
 
 
